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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
NEW YORK: A RE-EVALUATION
[I advocate] the total abolition of the Punish-
ment of Death, as a general principle, for
the advantage of society, for the prevention
of crime, and without the least reference to,
or tenderness for any individual malefactor
whatever.,
Charles Dickens (1846)
New York is the only state which has
retained a mandatory death sentence for
certain crimes.' In all other states the sen-
tence has either been abolished entirely or
been made discretionary. In view of the
accusations of outmodedness which have
been levelled at Section 1045 of the New
York Penal Law' the New York Legislature
has established the Temporary Commission
on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal
Code to investigate anew the argumentation
pro and con dealing with capital punishment.
A dispassionate re-examination of this cen-
turies-old controversy from the traditional
utilitarian and moralistic standpoints is war-
ranted before we can fruitfully examine the
sweeping changes this Commission advo-
1 COLLINS, DICKENS AND CRIME 224 (1962).
' Symposium On Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L.F.
247, 251 (1961). The only other jurisdiction to
retain a mandatory death penalty is the District of
Columbia.
3 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1045. Murder in the first de-
gree is punishable by death, unless the jury recom-
mends life imprisonment as provided by section
1045-a. (§ 1045-a permits life imprisonment for
felony-murder or depraved-mind murder).
cates in a bill it hopes to sponsor at this
session of the Legislature.
Utilitarian
Since the days when the remains of
executed persons were left exposed to the
public view in an effort to dissuade on-
lookers from committing crimes 4 the war
has been fought as to whether executions
have a significant deterrent effect against
future crime. It has been stated by his-
torians that pickpockets harvested their
largest crops from the pockets of spectators
who gathered around the hanging corpse. 5
In fact, the hangmen themselves tasted
death on the gallows - a fate which they
had so often meted out.6
A contention that execution is successful,
or at least a significant factor, in the preven-
tion of crime hinges on two assumptions.
The first is that a potential criminal will
reflectively consider the penalty which could
be imposed 7 and the second is that the
probability of its imposition be substantial.
Both of these premises have been severely
attacked by the abolitionists who argue that
the psychological effect upon a potential
murderer is minimal because the large ma-
4 Comment, 29 TENN. L. REV. 534, 535 (1962).
5 Id. at 540.
6 Id. at 541.
7Reichert, Capital Punishment Reconsidered, 47
Ky. L.J. 397, 404 (1959).
s Sellin, The Death Penalty, MODEL PENAL CODE
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) 20.
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jority of murderers are not normal and
hence cannot properly reason to the logical
consequences of their acts." Furthermore,
the argument proceeds, most murders are
crimes of passion's and the murderer acts
with a degree of spontaneity which reduces
his ability to premeditate." But even if the
individual could reflect upon the effect of
his acts, the second premise is faulty, say
the abolitionists, because the chances of his
incurring the death penalty have been reli-
ably estimated as being from 50-1 to 100-1.12
In view of the various studies which verify
the statistical improbability of suffering
capital punishment, it would seem that there
is solid ground for the belief that even upon
sufficient deliberation, the potential criminal
would have little fear that his life will be
taken.
A new twist to the deterrent argument, or
rather the lack of deterrent effect, is the
thesis that the death penalty actually stimu-
lates crime rather than prevents it.13 A study
taken in Alameda, Los Angeles, over a
nine-year period indicated that more homi-
cides were committed on the Thursdays and
9 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, comment (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959); Hart, Murder and the Princi-
ples of Punishment: England and the United
States, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 433, 459 (1957); Schues-
sler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty,
284 Annals 54, 63-64 (1952). "The relation be-
tween murderer and victim is usually primary,
hence, one that is likely to be suffused with emo-
tionality. This emotionality, probably heightened
during a crisis, doubtless interferes with the objec-
tive assessment of future consequences." Ibid.
10 Reichert, supra note 7, at 402.
11Id. at 404 n.17.
12 Comment, supra note 4, at 541; Symposium on
Capital Punishment, supra note 2, at 253, 294;
Kingsley, Life or Death: Another View, 35 J. OF
STATE BAR OF CAL. 543, 550 (1960).
13 Blease, Abolition of the Death Penalty in Cali-
fornia, 19 LAw. GUILD REV. 58, 59 (1959).
Fridays when executions were performed
than when there were no such executions
scheduled.14 In the city of Philadelphia, a
study prepared before and after five differ-
ent executions revealed that during the
sixty-day period preceding them, ninety-one
homicides were committed whereas 113
were committed during the sixty-day period
subsequent to the infliction of the death
penalty. 5 While it is evident that these two
studies are far from conclusive, they are
offered to indicate that further inquiry along
these lines is warranted and indeed might
revolutionize the deterrent concept. The de-
terent argument is still in a state of flux.
Professor Sellin has made a comprehensive
state-by-state study on the deterrent effect
of capital punishment and concluded that
the frequency of murders is conditioned by
factors other than the death penalty.16 His
data reveal that:
1) The level of the homicide death rates
varies in different groups of states.... 2)
Within each group of states having similar
social and economic conditions and popula-
tions, it is impossible to distinguish the abo-
lition state from the others. 3) The trends
of the homicide death rates of comparable
states with or without the dealth penalty are
similar."
His conclusion was that "executions have
no discernable effect on homicide death
rates. -18
14 McCafferty, Major Trends in the Use of Capital
Punishment, 25 Fed. Prob. 15, 20 (Sept. 1961).
15 Ibid. One author has thought it worthwhile to
note that on the same day nineteen year-old
Charles Starkweather was sentenced to die after a
highly-publicized trial, 90 miles away a 17 year-
old killed two people and himself. Ibid. This com-
ment would have greater significance had the
author established that the defendant had actual
knowledge of the Starkweather execution.
16 Sellin, supra note 8, at 24-25.
171 d. at 34.
18 Ibid.
A second utilitarian argument centers
around the alleged economic benefit to
society, the belief being that life imprison-
ment would be more costly. Such a view has
been counted with the contention that when
the penalty is death, a prolonged legal battle
invariably occurs which is likewise costly to
society. The expense involved in successive
new trials and appeals is added to that of
construction and maintenance of "death-
rows" and the result is an expense ap-
proaching that of life imprisonment. 19 One
lawyer has estimated that it costs the state
of California between $50,000 and $100,-
000 for each execution. 20 It is felt by some
that under a well-organized system, "lifers"
would not be a financial burden to society.21
The imprisoned could perform useful work
for the state such as working on highway
construction and consequently reduce the
estimated $1200-$1800 jailing cost per
year.22 It would seem then that the economic
argument is not going to be determinative
of an individual's ultimate stand on capital
punishment because the difference in cost
between life imprisonment and death ad-
19 Caldwell, Why is the Death Penalty Retained?,
284 Annals 45, 48 (1952). "When the penalty
may be death, the legal battle is often fierce and
prolonged as each side struggles for an advantage.
Much time and money may be spent in the selec-
tion of jurors acceptable to both sides, in the em-
ployment of experts and witnesses, and in the
successive new trials and appeals that may ensue.
Add to this the cost of constructing, maintaining,
and staffing a suitable place of detention for those
awaiting execution and it can be seen that the cost
of inflicting capital punishment may be very great
- greater, . . . than life imprisonment." Ibid.
20 Blease, supra note 13* at 61. The Chessman trial
cost the state of California approximately one mil-
lion dollars. Ibid.
21 Sellin, The Death Penalty, MODEL PENAL CODE
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) 18; Sellin, Capital Pun-
ishment, 25 Fed. Prob. 3 (Sept. 1961).
22 Comment, 29 TENN, L. REV. 534, 549 (1962).
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ministered by the state is not substantial.
An argument offered in behalf of aboli-
tion consists of the fear that the discretionary
use of capital punishment in the great ma-
jority of jurisdictions results in an inequality
in its application, depending upon differ-
ences in judgment and other accidents of
time and place. 23 Various contentions are
offered in this rather broad area. It is said
that women receive favor by the courts.
Although women commit one out of every
seven murders in this country, only one
woman is executed each year as compared
to forty-seven men.24 In the state of Cali-
fornia, only three women have ever been
executed although they commit approxi-
mately fifteen per cent of the annual homi-
cides.2" Racial discrimination is another bit-
ter battleground in the "equal justice under
the law" argument. Proponents of abolition
claim that the Negro is bearing the brunt of
such punishment in the discretionary states
and the available facts would seem to indi-
cate that the contention has some validity. 26
From 1930 to 1957, there were 3,568 exe-
cutions in the United States. More than
one-half involved non-whites and consider-
ably more than one-half occurred in the
South.2 7 The 1958 figures reveal that twenty-
seven of the forty-eight persons executed in
the United States were Negroes.2 8 These
23 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, comment 64 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959).
24 Comment, supra note 22, at 542.
253 Blease, Abolition of the Death Penalty in Cali-
fornia, 19 LAW. GUILD REV. 58, 59 (1959).
26 Symposium on Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L.F.
247, 259 (1961).
27 Sellin, supra note 21, at 5.
28 See Sellin, The Death Penalty, MODEL PENAL
CODE (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) 82. In the case of
Hampton v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 531, 58
S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 914 (1950), the
NAACP appealed on the ground that the Com-
monwealth of Virginia had a policy of applying
the death penalty for rape only to Negroes and
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figures are far from conclusive because of
the missing factor of the incidence of crimes
punishable by death committed by white
men, but the following specifics shed some
light on the overall facts. In Virginia from
1909 to 1950, forty-two Negroes were exe-
cuted for rape while not a single white man
was so punished even though 809 whites
had been convicted of rape which was pun-
ishable by death at the discretion of the jury. 9
Another cogent fact indicating inequality is
that under Louisiana's penal code, a dis-
tinction between "aggravated rape" which
is punishable by death and "simple rape"
which can be punishable by only imprison-
ment for one year is made in order to allow
the prosecutor to indict the man under
either statute, depending on the color of
his skin.2 0 A recent study in Pennsylvania
establishes that between 1914 and 1958,
439 persons were sentenced to death in
Pennsylvania. In six per cent of the cases,
Negro felony-murderers received commu-
tations whereas white felony-murderers were
so favored in over seventeen per cent of the
cases. 1
While these are facts which bolster the
inequality of administration argument, one
wonders if they would be significant in the
event it were established that those actually
executed deserved this penalty. If it were so
established, the proponents of this view-
point would merely be stating that there
are those who escape the punishment they
deserve. The argument begs the question in
that it criticizes the manner in which the law
that such discrimination was unconstitutional.
Ibid.
29 Reichert, Capital Punishment Reconsidered, 47
KY. L.J. 397, 411 n.35 (1959).
30 Comment, supra note 22, at 545.
31 Id. at 543; Sellin, Capital Punishment, 25 Fed.
Prob. 3, 10 (1961).
is administered and not the penalty itself.
Perhaps the most outspoken groups fa-
voring retention of the death penalty are the
law enforcement agencies, 32 which believe
that abolition would make the policeman's
lot a more hazardous one because the threat
of the death penalty dissuades criminals
from either carrying lethal weapons or from
using them against the police when in
danger of being arrested. J. Edgar Hoover,
employing such reasoning, has spoken out
against abolition many times. 3 A recent
study substantiates the conclusion that there
is no factual basis for the belief that more
police are killed in abolition states. The rate
per 100,000 population of fatal attacks on
police in eighty-two cities in the abolition
states was 1.2% and in 182 cities in the
death penalty states, 1.3%, a minute differ-
ence." In view of these results, it would
appear that the thinking of law enforcement
officers does not conform to the facts. The
most vigorously propounded utilitarian
arguments are evidently laden with emotion,
for time and time again, the facts seem to
belie popular conceptions. The deeper roots
for such beliefs, it would appear, lie imbed-
ded in the moral fibre of our society.
Because of the lack of conclusive statis-
tical data as to the deterrent effectiveness
of capital punishment, the proponents and
opponents of its abolition carry on their
dialogue primarily on the basis of moral
considerations and, in many instances, from
purely emotional points of view. It is to be
realized that often the moral attitude as-
serted stems directly from emotions, and
32 Sellin, supra note 31, at 3; Murdy, A Moderate
View of Capital Punishment, 25 Fed. Prob. 11, 13
(1961).
33 Murdy, supra note 32, at 14.
34 Sellin, The Death Penalty, MODEL PENAL CODE
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) 52-62.
that the separation of the two is made for
the convenience of analysis.
Moralistic and Psychiatric
It is precisely in this area that one can
appreciate the interplay and seeming con-
flict between morality and psychiatry. Often,
one's view of murder and the murderer
predetermines his attitude toward capital
punishment. The impact of psychiatry on
the concept of free will and on one's control
over his environment has had a concomitant
effect on the issue of capital punishment.
Thus, those who view the murderer as hav-
ing a diseased mind prescribe clinical treat-
ment rather than punishment.-0 Underlying
this approach is a deterministic concept:";
which disregards the various motivational
factors which enter into killing.37
The moral issue becomes clearer, once
it is accepted that there are what can be
labelled "normal murderers" for whom Pro-
fessor Guttmacher has given us a descrip-
tion:
Certainly one must admit that such individ-
uals are maladjusted to society. But, in all
35 "It is absurd to think of punishing a person who
is suffering from cancer or any other malignant
disease. It is likewise absurd to punish those who
are socially ill to the degree that they commit
socially disapproved acts." BARNES & TEETERS,
NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 359 (1951).
3 Professor Cohen answered this deterministic at-
titude in the following manner: "When we are
considering whether we should or should not pun-
ish certain individuals, it is irrelevant to argue that
no one can help doing what he does. For against
such an argument it is fair to reply as the irate
father did to the wayward son who used it: 'If no
one can help doing what he does, then I can't help
punishing you.'" Cohen, Moral Aspects of The
Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 999 (1940).
37 A good discussion of these various factors to-
gether with numerous case studies can be found in
GUTTMACHER, THE MIND OF THE MURDERER
(1960).
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probability, the genesis of such defective
personality structure has resulted from the
defective ethical standards which flourish in
the social milieu in which they are spawned,
rather than from hidden neurotic com-
plexesA8
It is at this juncture that the polar moral
attitudes take shape. On the one hand, some
profess that the moral law forbids any kind
of killing irrespective of who commits it -
a muderer or the state punishing the mur-
derer, '0- and on the other, there are those
who contend that the moral law demands
the exaction of capital punishment where it
is warranted on the principle of retribution,
i.e., to exact suffering commensurate with
the suffering caused society in order to re-
establish the moral equilibrium. 4° Both po-
sitions disregard the utilitarian concept of
deterrence.
The underlying reason for denying the
state the right to exact the death penalty as
punishment is based on man's inherent right
to life, which right cannot be taken away
under any conditions. Application of this
principle seems untenable when viewed by
the experience the world has had with war
and murder throughout its history.4 1 The
3s Id. at 20.
3.) "For some people the death penalty is ruled out
entirely as something absolutely evil which, like
torture, should never be used however many lives
it might save." Hart, Murder and the Principles of
Punishment: England and the United States, 52
Nw. U.L. REV. 433, 447 (1957).
40 Ibid. "The basic conception is that retribution is
punishment which, independently of human will, is
suffered as the consequence of doing harm; as re-
gards its having a purpose, it is to make the person
upon whom it is inflicted suffer to counterbalance
the suffering he has caused." Snyder, Capital Pun-
ishment: The Moral Issue, 63 W. VA. L. REv. 99,
107 (1961).
41 It would seem that this view would preclude the
right to self-defense by one whose life is threat-
ened. Such a view seems highly idealistic.
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contrary position would allow the sovereign
to participate in the Creator's right over life
and death in certain instances where one by
his own action has forfeited his right to life.
42
This latter position, on analogy to the prin-
ciple of self-defense, requires that the state
utilize capital punishment despite its seem-
ing ineffectiveness as a deterrent. 43 The self-
defense argument has also been asserted by
those who favor capital punishment as being
a dictate of nature:
It is my belief that the death penalty is pre-
scribed by Nature in every part of the uni-
verse and in all phases of universal life. It
does not seem to be in absolute contradic-
tion with personal rights, because when the
death of another is absolutely necessary, it
is' perfectly just, as a case of self-defense,
whether individual or social.
4 4
Although it is not the purpose of this dis-
cussion to adopt either of these moral posi-
tions, it is significant to point out that there
is a long tradition which supports the view
in favor of retention, thus placing the burden
on the abolitionists to demonstrate the rea-
sonableness of their cause. The death penalty
is as old as man himself 45 and deeply rooted
42 This theory relies on certain basic assumptions.
See Riley, The Right of the State To Inflict Capital
Punishment, 6 CATHOLIC LAWYER 279-80 (1960).
While Bishop Riley speaks in terms of forfei-
ture of the right itself, the better view seems to
have been stated by Jacques Maritain: "If a crim-
inal can be justly condemned to die, it is because
by his crime he has deprived himself, let us not
say of the right to live, but of the possibility of
justly asserting this right: he has morally cut him-
self off from the human community, precisely as
regards the use of this fundamental and 'inalien-
able' right which the punishment inflicted upon
him prevents him from exercising." MARITAIN,
MAN AND THE STATE 101-02 (1951).
43 RILEY, supra note 42, at 281-82.
44 FERRI, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY 528 (1917).
45 See LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT (1960).
in his psychic makeup. 46
If one is going to assert that capital pun-
ishment is only a moral issue, one must
consider its morality independently of any
utilitarian considerations of deterrence,
economy or inequality of administration.
Yet, even when one restricts the controversy
to moral considerations, there is no unanim-
ity among churchmen. The Rt. Rev. Msgr.
J. P. Moreton, ex-prison chaplain at Utah
State Penitentiary, stated that "man should
not be permitted to destroy the one thing
which cannot be restored-life, a gift of
Almighty God Himself."47 Another leading
moral thinker, Bishop Thomas J. Riley, a
member of the Massachusetts Legislative
Committee to study capital punishment, ex-
pressed a contrary view:
When a man, through his own fault, has
endangered the right of the state to carry on
its divinely appointed functions, there may
be reason to assume that he has forfeited his
God-given right to live, and that the taking
of his life may be justified as an indispen-
sable means of protecting society from
4, There is a great deal of testimony to the basic
instinct of revenge in society. "For the delight
seemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt as in
making the party repent." BACON, Essay of Re-
venge. See Odenwald, Punishment From The
Viewpoint of Psychiatry, 6 CATHOLiC LAWYER 126,
128 (1960). Colorado reinstated the death penalty
because of the increase in lynchings during its abo-
lition which was attributed to the "lynch-instinct"
of the people. See Note, 5 BUFFALO L. REV. 304,
306 n.l (1956).
It seems that it was fashionable at one time to
send invitations to hangings:
You are cordially invited to attend the hang-
ing of one George Smiley, murderer. His soul
will swing into eternity on Dec. 8, 1896, at 2
P.M. sharp, Latest improved methods in the art
of scientific strangulation will be employed, and
everything possible will be done to make sur-
roundings cheerful and the execution a success.
(Signed) F. J. Wattron, Sheriff of Navajo
County (Ariz.), DONELLY, GOLDSTEIN &
SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW (1962).
47 Symposium on Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L.F.
247, 290 (1961).
serious harm.48
The utilitarian arguments, as has been
shown, are far from clear-cut, and likewise,
there seem to be no binding or ultimately
convincing moralistic arguments which must
sway the objective listener. Is it not possible
that the most important single factor is emo-
tionalism and that it is the very nature of
death itself which demands an emotional
reaction 49 which carries over into any con-
troversy involving death? If this be true,
then perhaps all arguments and statistics are
but so much extraneous matter in the forma-
tion of one's own personal judgement and
the determinative ingredient is simply one's
emotional reaction to the concept of the
state's extinguishing life. This analysis has
been succinctly expressed by Clarence Dar-
row, a well-known crusader for abolition:
There is just one thing in all this question.
It is a question of how you feel, that is all.
It is all inside of you. If you love the thought
of somebody being killed, why you are for
it. If you hate the thought... you are againstit.50
Whatever may be the pulse of New York
residents concerning the abolition of capital
punishment, one thing is certain: the time
has come to seriously question New York's
solitary retention of the mandatory death
penalty. The Temporary Commission on
Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal
Code has unequivocally stated that such
compulsory death should be terminated by
the 1963 session of the Legislature.
48 Ibid.
49 "When life is at hazard in a trial, it sensational-
izes the whole thing almost unwittingly; the effect
on juries, the Bar, the public, the judiciary, I re-
gard as very bad." OF LAW AND MEN, PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1939-56) 77
(Elman ed. 1956).
50 Debate on capital punishment between Clarence
Darrow and Judge Talley, in ATTORNEY FOR THE
DAMNED 89, 95-96 (Weinberg ed. 1951).
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The Proposed Bill
The Commission intends to sponsor a bill
which will advocate far-reaching changes.
Under present New York law, there are
only two instances where the death penalty
might be avoided: 1) if the crime were a
felony-murder and the jury recommends life
imprisonment, 5'1 2) in the case of a wanton
or depraved type of killing and the jury rec-
ommends life imprisonment 5 2 Furthermore,
the court is not bound by the jury's recom-
mendation. The first proposed change which
the Commission itself terms "drastic"' 3 is
that the jury's power of recommending life
imprisonment be extended to all cases of
first-degree murder. Further, unlike present
law, should the jury determine that the'sen-
tence be life imprisonment, this conclusion
would bind the court.
The second major revision to be proposed
is that the murder trial be in two stages. 54 At
the end of the trial proper, a verdict would
be rendered as to guilt or innocence. A
second proceeding would be held if the de-
fendant is over eighteen years of age (under
eighteen, the life imprisonment verdict would
be automatic) at which a special penalty
verdict would be rendered. The appealing
feature of this proceeding to determine the
proper penalty is that the exclusionary rules
of evidence would not apply and a wide vari-
ety of information dealing with the convicted
person's economic and religious background
would be admitted. In short, information
which might provide a fairer basis for such
a penalty determination would not be ex-
1 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1045-a.
52 See N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1045-a.
53 TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE
PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE, INTERIM REPORT
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 6 (February 1, 1963).
54 ibid.
 
